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THE ~ERMATH OF APPRECIATIONS
ABSTRACT
This paper empirically analyzes a broad range of real exchange rate appreciation episodes.
The cases are identified after compiling a large sample of monthly multilateral real exchange rates
from 1960 to 1994. The objective is twofold. First, the paper studies the dynamics of appreciations,
avoiding the sample selection of analyzing exclusively the crisis (or devaluation) cases. Second, the
paper analyzes the mechanism by which overvaluations are corrected. In particular, we are interested
in the proportion of the reversions that occur through nominal devaluations, rather than cumulative
inflation differentials. We calculate the probability of undoing appreciations without nominal
depreciations for various degrees of misalignment. The overall conclusion is that it is very unlikely












One of the leading explanations behind almost all exchange rate crises is that the real
exchange rate was previously overvalued. This would explain the market speculation
against the currencies and the subsequent real devaluation. Although economists do
not agree on the concept of overvaluation (sometimes called misalignment or just
appreciation) or on its empirical counterpart, the magnitude of two recent crises
reintroduced the discussion. In 1992, the exchange rate crises in Italy, Spain, and
the United Kingdom affected the perceived sustainability of the European Monetary
System and cast doubts about the success of the future European Union. In 1994, the
magnitude of the Mexican exchange rate crisis and its implications for global financial
instability obliged the US treasury and the IMF to mobilize a rescue package.
There is a vast literature on whether exchange rate overvaluation was the main
cause behind each of these crises. There has a]so been some effort in identifying com-
mon factors to exchange rate crises and major devaluations. 1 However, the sample of
countries chosen in these studies is not adequate to answer some important questions.
For example, the question what is the probability that a currency which has appreci-
ated by 25% in real terns will face a crisis or need a large devaluation? cannot be
answered with a sample of devaluations or crises only. 2 This sample selection bias
does not exist in studies that test Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) but their focus is
on whether the real exchange rate will eventually revert to its mean and not on how
this reversion occurs. Surprisingly, little attention has been given to the likelihood
of crises or devaluations in appreciation episodes. More generally there are, to our
knowledge, no studies that focus on characterizing appreciations.
The importance of describing appreciations and the likelihood of devaluation is
easier to understand as a practical matter. Several countries have used the exchange
rate as an instrument to stabilize inflation and coordinate expectations around an
easy focus point. In several cases, the credibility of the policy maker seems to depend
largely on her ability to maintain the exchange rate peg. There are several current
1See Dornbusch, Goldfajn and Vald6s (1995); Eichengreen, Rose, and W yplosz (1994) and (1995);
and Edwards (1989) for some recent attempts to characterize exchange rate crises and devaluations.
All these studies find that the RER is overvalued during the period previous to devaluations.
2Klein and Marion (1994) study the duration of peg regimes in Latin America avoiding this sample
selection problem. However, they do not address the questions we try to answer here. Interestingly,
they conclude that the level of the RER is the main determinant of the duration of pegs.
2examples. In the context of developing countries Argentina and Brazil are interesting
cases. Argentina’s economic policy and credibility depend largely on its ability to
sustain the peg. After four years of higher inflation at home than abroad in a fixed
exchange regime, the Argentinean Peso appreciated considerably in real terms. Even
if one takes for granted that in the medium or long run the Argentinean Peso will
revert to its PPP value, the question of how this reversion will occur is still relevant.
A nominal devaluation would probably undermine the credibility of the government’s
economic policy and induce capital outflows d la Mexico. Thus, for Argentinean
policymakers (and public) and international investors the question of how likely it is
to have a smooth landing (avoiding a large devaluation), given how appreciated their
currency is, becomes extremely important. The same is true in the case of Brazil.
From a theoretical perspective there are several reasons why it is important to
understand the dynamics of appreciations, and especially how they are corrected.
In fact, several models assume (and some derive) real costs of a nominal exchange
rate devaluation. For example, in building a model to discuss whether currency
crises are self-fulfilling, Krugman (1996) assumes that there are real costs in terms
of reputation when the authority decides to devalue. The literature on exchange-rate
based stabilizations, on the other hand, has stressed the importance of imperfect
credibility as an explanation for the consumption boom and real appreciation that
usually accompany such stabilizations. Credibility, in that literature, is defined as the
likelihood of the abandonment of the peg. 3 Knowing whether it is possible to correct
an overvaluation without a (large) nominal devaluation is a key step in evaluating the
plausibility of the imperfect credibility explanation. Finally, the analysis of how likely
is an appreciation episode to end through inflation differentials rather than nominal
exchange rate movements sheds light to the question of how rigid nominal prices are
and how persistent inflation is.
This paper empirically analyzes a broad range of real exchange rate appreciation
cases. For that purpose, we define appreciations as PPP departures in the short and
medium run. The cases are identified after compiling a large sample of monthly mul-
tilateral real exchange rates from 1960 to 1994. The objective is twofold. First, the
paper studies the dynamics of appreciations, avoiding the sample selection of analyz-
3See Rebelo and V6gh (1995) for an evaluation of competing explanations of the stylized facts of
exchange rate-based stabilizations.
3ing exclusively the crisis (or devaluation) cases. In particular, we analyze the number
of appreciation cases that exist under different definitions, their duration, temporal
distribution and exchange rate arrangement characteristics. The main conclusions
are as follows: First, the most striking result is the large asymmetry between the
duration of the appreciation build-up and the return-to-normality phases. Second,
we present evidence that fixed arrangements are more likely to suffer appreciations.
Third, we show that appreciation episodes happen more often during the last part of
our sample period (1980–94). Finally, we also show that episodes are notably shorter
when fundamentals are considered.
The second objective of the paper is to analyze the mechanism by which the over-
valuations are corrected. In particular, we study what proportion of the reversions
occurs through nominal devaluations rather than through nominal price adjustments
(or cumulative inflation differentials). We calculate the probability of successful ap-
preciations for various degrees of appreciation. 4 Figure 1 shows a typical result. Note
that there are no successful cases when an appreciation reaches 35% or more.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the theoretical framework that
defines real exchange rates and overvaluation episodes. Section 3 characterizes ap-
preciation episodes across time and exchange rate regimes. Section 4 decomposes the
return-to-equilibrium real depreciation into the fraction of the adjustment that takes
place through nominal exchange rates and inflation differentials, respectively. This
section also calculates the probability y of successful adjustment. Section 5 concen-
trates on the dynamics of appreciation episodes and calculates transition matrices.
Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Methodology and Data
In order to analyze and interpret movements of the real exchange rate (RER) as an
appreciation episode one needs to define an equilibrium concept and the dynamics
out of steady state. This is not an easy task. In fact, we speculate that one of the
main reasons that prevented previous attempts to characterize overvaluations is the
lack of a consensus around a sound empirical counterpart to any definition of the
4We formally define the term successful appreciation in section 4. For now, we mean appreciations
that end without large nominal devaluations.
40.35{1
Appreciation [Percentage)
Figure 1: Probability of Successful Appreciation
equilibrium RER. The RER between two countries is defined as the relative cost of
a common bmket of goods measured in terms of a common numeraire: PI /P2, where
Pi is the price of the basket in country Z.
The equilibrium concept we use is Purchasing Power Parity - PPP, probably the
simplest and most powerful theory of real exchange determination.5 It is based on the
Law of One Price which states that, abstracting from tariffs and transportation costs,
free trade in goods should ensure identical prices of these goods across countries. This
implies that the same basket of goods in two different countries must have the same
price, or P1/Pz = 1.
This paper denotes by overvaluation or appreciation the episodes of PPP de-
partures in the short or medium run .6 The correction of PPP deviations (or over-
valued RER) can be thought to occur through the
currency generates unsustainable current account
5See Dornbusch (1987) for an historical perspective.
following channel. An overvalued
deficits through the loss of com-
6We ignore undervalued episodes. The emphasis on overvaluations in the literature and policy
discussions is probably because prices and wages are flexible upwards. Presumably, undervaluations
are less costly to reverse.
5petitiveness. The latter also leads to possible recession and losses of reserves. All
of these effects will work to adjust domestic prices expressed in foreign currency to
international levels. 7
In the definition of RER we can theoretically disaggregate the price levels in three
categories: Price of exports (Pz), price of imports (Pm) and price of nontraded goods
(P.).8 The RER is then defined as follows:
(1)
Taking logs and rearranging we have:
e = {~(Pm –P:) +8(P. –P;)} + {7(P. –Pi)} + {(~– ~’)P2+ (P– P’)Pj+ (7–7’)P:},
or equivalently,
e = Departures from Law of One Price + Relative price of nontradables+
Terms of Trade effect.
The idea is that when the law of one price holds, ceteris paribus, there will be no
pressure on relative prices (current account deficits will be optimal, wages and prices
in equilibrium). This amounts to:
Pz =P~ and Pm =P~,
We can abstract from the direct Terms of Trade effect if we assume that the weights
are not so different between the baskets. If a – a’ = O, ~ – ~’ = 0 and ~ – y’ = (),
then we have:
e = {Q(P*– p;) + B(Pz – P:)} + {’Y(P. – Pl)}j (2)
where we remain with only two components, namely departures from the law of one
7A fundamental issue for the interpretation of our paper is whether the RER is a trend-stationary
stochastic process —that is if it tends to revert towards its mean. Recent studies have shown that
this is indeed the case. See Froot and Rogoff (1995), Isard (1995) and Breuer (1994).
‘Here the subscript m (or x) represents the import (export) good in the home country which is,
also, the export (import ) good of the rest of the world.
6price and nontradables price differences.
If we assume that differences in nontradable prices do not exert reverting pres-
sures (as in the case of haircuts), then only differences in tradable prices should be
considered in the overvaluation measure. Therefore, one needs to disentangle the two
components of the RER above. One approach is to assume that equilibrium move-
ments in the term Y(P. – p:) of equation (2) occur slowly and that time trends will
capture these movements. 9 A second approach is to control for the effects of funda-
mentals by regressing the RER on several variables that are related to nontradable
prices but not to departures from the law of one price.l”
We follow both approaches in the paper. We first follow the approach of regressing
the RER on time trends, without taking into account fundamentals. Besides being a
simple procedure, this would be the optimal approach if the price index had a small
11 For each country proportion of nontraded goods, and their prices change smoothly.
we calculate
Epr = a + T’~, (3)
where EP~ is the predicted value from the regression of the log of the RER on two
time trends (linear and square) denoted by T.
Using the predicted value as our equilibrium real exchange rate, the departures
from equilibrium are calculated as follows (normalizing the series to 100 when the
RER is in equilibrium):
where E is the original series.
(4)
‘An example of these movements is the Balassa-Samuelson effect. When there is a productivity
growth differential between the traded and nontraded goods sectors and this differential is not
homogeneous across countries, then the (cross country) relative prices of nontraded goods, and
therefore, the RER, will change over time.
100ne could argue that some of the fundamentals chosen may also be related to the departures
from the law of one price. In this case, this second approach will tend to underestimate the extent
of overvaluation. Since the first approach does not control for fundamentals and may overestimate
the extent of overvaluation, one can interpret the resulting two series as defining the boundaries of
the true overvaluation episode.
11Since the RER is trend-stationary this is a perfectly valid procedure.
72.1 Controlling for Fundamentals
We also follow the second approach. Here we assume that nontraded prices do change
with movements in fundamentals. Thus, we want to clean RER movements from
changes in the term Y(pn – p;) of equation (2).
Operationally, we calculate for each country:
where X is the set of fundamentals.
The fundamentals we use to isolate the RER movements from movements of non-
traded good prices are the following: 12
Terms of Trade (TOT) TOT shocks affect the relative price of nontradables in
small open economies. 13 If there is a positive permanent shock, the demand for
nontradables will increase with the increase in permanent income. In equilibrium,
the relative price of nontradables will rise and we should observe a real appreciation.
If the shock is temporary, and therefore the effect on permanent national income
is small, the demand for nontradables will not increase and the relative price of
nontradables will not react, provided the supply is unchanged. This will be the case
whenever there is a fixed cost to move resources out of the tradable sector and decrease
the supply in the short run. Otherwise, even temporary TOT shocks can have an
effect on the RER. Here we assume that TOT affect the equilibrium RER through
supply effects only in the long and medium run. Then, the optimal procedure is to
net out the effect of TOT and smooth the resultant predicted values, In this way
long run trends will be captured and very short effects smoothed.
In the case of large countries there is an endogeneity problem because the TOT
are defined simultaneously to the relative price of nontraded goods.
Government Spending An expansion in government spending will appreciate the
RER if it increases the overall demand for nontradables. This will be the case if the
12One may consider capital inflows as an additional fundamental. However, these flows are just
the counterpart of the current account plus reserves, and therefore, are simultaneously determined
with the RER. For that reason, we chose not to include them in the regressions.
13See Edwards (1989).
8government propensity to consume nontradables is larger than the private sector’s.
When thepropensities arethe same and anincrease inexpenditures is financed by
debt the effect depends on how permanent is the shock and how forward looking
are consumers. As a general rule, the effect on nontradable prices increases the
more temporary the government shocks are (when the shocks are temporary the
private sector will not decrease consumption proportionally) and the less forward
looking consumers are(Ricardian equivalence will not hold). We measure government
spending as the ratio of government expendituresto GDP.
Openness Openness reflects how connected the economy is to the rest ofthe world
and stands here for trade liberalization. It is proxied here by the ratio ofexports plus
imports toGDP.
A trade liberalization generates an equilibrium RER depreciation from a labor
market general equilibrium perspective. The decrease in tariffs generates the necessity
of a crowding-in to restore full emplyment, This, in turn, requires a reduction in the
price of nontradables.14
Some transitory shocks to the fundamentals we consider have no effect on equilib-
rium RER’s.’5 In this case, because the regression in equation (3) will capture the
long run relationship between the RER and fundamentals, short run movements in
the latter may generate false short term movements in our “equilibrium” estimate.
These movements, however, will be unrelated to movements in the actual RER. In or-
der to minimize this effect, we smooth the predicted RER’s with a 12-month centered
moving average.
2.2 Episode Definition and Phases
Figure 2 presents an example of an appreciation episode. We define the start of
an appreciation case as the time when the difference between the actual RER and
our estimate of “equilibrium” RER (the predicted value from equations (3) or (5))
is equal or higher than a certain threshold (e.g., 1570 or 25Yo). The appreciation
ends when this difference hits a second threshold associated with the existence of no
14See Dornbusch (1974).
15An example is given by a transitory positive shock to the terms of trade.
9appreciation. We define this second threshold as 5%. In order to control for data
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Figure2: Appreciation Episode Definition and Phases
four notable points: (i) Stafl, when theappreciation hits the threshold,
(ii) End, when the appreciation disappears –i.e., the RER hits the 5% benchmark,
(iii) Peak, when theappreciation is the highest, and (iv) History, when theappre-
ciation first reached 5%. An appreciation episode is then defined as the Start-End
period.
There are also two phases: History-Peak, representing the build-up problem and
Peak-End, representing the return to a “normal” level.lG
16The phases add-up to more than an episode because the latter does not include the build-
up to the appreciation threshold. In characterizing episodes, we are interested in what happens
conditionally on being appreciated, not just in general.
102.3 Data Description
The initial sample is given by monthly data of 93 countries during the period 1960-
1994 (39,060 observations). Because of missing values the actual sample size of RER
is equivalent to 86.170 of the potential sample (when we include fundamentals the
actual sample size falls to 73.6% of the potential sample size). The initial sample is
composed of countries in the Summers and Heston database with more than 1 million
people in 1985, with monthly price data from the International Financial Statistics
(IFS), and with origin-destination trade data from the United Nations’ Yearbook of
~ade Statistics. The list of countries is presented in appendix D.
We construct the multilateral RER for each country as a trade-weighted average
of bilateral RER’s with those trading partners encompassing 4% or more of trade (in
either exports or imports). The weights are fixed and represent the trade flows of
1985, or the closest year for which data is available. They are presented in appendix
E,17
In order to minimize the effect of movements in nontradables prices, we construct
our empirical measure of RER using WPI when possible. Consumer price indices
may contain a large proportion of nontraded final goods in their index that have
little effect on competitiveness. It is not surprising, then, that it is easier to reject
the random walk hypothesis when WPI are used in PPP tests. When countries do
not have a reliable WPI series we use CPI. This is the case with some developing
countries (see appendix D for a complete list). Since these countries tend to have
also a higher inflation than the average, we are confident that even these cases have
a mean-reversion process.
One caveat regarding our RER construction is that some WPI’S may have a large
component of an imported intermediate good that is not produced at home. This
implies that for some countries the WPI may not be a good proxy for their price level
and competitiveness. Although we do not control for these cases and, therefore, we
may not detect some appreciation cases, this should not bias our results regarding
how the RER returns to equilibrium.
17We checked for data errors in the original data using graphic methods. The price series of El
Salvador for 1977 was geometrically interpolated from December 1976 and January 1978 because
it shows a break in 1978 (the IFS flags the series as having a break and it shows deflation of 21%
in 1 month). Missing values of price data of Ghana (Apr. ‘81–Jan. ’82), Iran (Jul. ‘86–Mar. ’89), and
Kuwait (Jan. ‘84–Dee. ’84) were also interpolated.
11In order to analyze the role of the nominal exchange rate and inflation differentials
in the return-to-normal phase of the RER one needs a nominal exchange rate index
for each month and country. We construct this index using the exchange arrange-
ment description of the IMF annual report Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions. The report presents for each country a summary of the exchange ar-
rangement status as of December of each year and a chronology of changes during
that same year. We use this information to construct a monthly exchange arrange-
ments database describing the principal features of the arrangements. Appendix C
presents a description of the coding and summary statistics describing the arrange-
ments. With this data on hand we construct a nominal index for each month and
country. When the arrangement is a peg we use the respective nominal exchange rate;
when the arrangement is an unknown basket we usually use the nominal exchange
rate with respect to SDR (in some cases we use the last peg); when the arrangement
is floating we use the currency used in the last peg that was in place. la
The data for the construction of fundamentals has annual frequency and the
sources are the following: Terms of Trade are from the World Bank Tables com-
pleted with unit import and export prices from the IFS for 1960-64 and 1993-94,
Openness (the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP) and government spending (as
percentage of GDP) are from the Summers and Heston database, completed with the
World Bank’s Development Report data for 1993-94 when possible.lg
3 Characterizing Appreciations
This section presents several features of the episodes in our sample. In particular,
we analyze the number of appreciation cases that exist under different definitions,
their duration, temporal distribution and exchange rate characteristics. The main
conclusions can be summarized as follows: First, the most striking result is the large
asymmetry between the duration of the appreciation build-up and the return-to-
normality phases. Second, we present evidence that fixed arrangements are more
18We classify target zones with a width less than 7% as pegs, We classify crawling pegs, managed
floating, and periodic adjustable pegs aa flexible arrangements and use the underlying nominal
exchange rate for our index.
lgIn order to use these data in monthly regressions we interpolate the yearly data using June as
the base month.
12likely to suffer appreciations. Third, we show that appreciation episodes happen
more often during the last part of our sample period (1980-94). Finally, we also show
that episodes are notably shorter when fundamentals are considered.
3.1 Number of Appreciations
The number of appreciations episodes that exist in our sample depends on both the
cutoff that defines appreciations (the threshold that defines the start date in figure 2)
and the method we use in defining the “equilibrium” RER (the RER~T in equations
(3) or (5)). Table 1 presents these results.
Table 1: Number of Appreciation Episodes
Apprec. Cutoff RER Estimate






As expected, the number of episodes declines with the appreciation cutoff (for
example, there are only 36 and 20 cases that had an appreciation larger than 35%).
Also, there are less cases when we take into consideration the effect of fundamentals
in the equilibrium RER estimation. The methodology disregards some appreciations
episodes that were previously detected because their actual RER movements are now
considered equilibrium changes (given the movement of fundamentals) .20
20We also get some new episodes because of movements in fundamentals. We smoothed the
predicted RER in order to minimize the number of “false” appreciation ewes —the ones driven by
excess movement of our equilibrium values. See section 2.1.
133.2 Duration
The average duration of appreciations depends on both the threshold that defines
appreciations and whether fundamentals are considered. Moreover, duration is very
different between the History-Peak and Peak-End phases. In what follows we will
focus on4 benchmark cases: appreciation thresholds of15%and 25%, with and with-
out controlling for fundamentals. Table 2 presents the statistics of average duration
in months, including incomplete cases.
Table 2: Average Duration of Appreciations (Months)
Entire Episode History-Peak Peak-End
Trends - 15% 22.2 19.5 11.1
Trends - 25% 22.8 26.8 11.1
Fundam. - 15% 11.2 10.2 6.8
Fundam. - 25% 8.5 12.3 4.6
The average duration of appreciations using only time trends to estimate the
equilibrium is about 2 years. Using fundamentals, the average duration drops by
approximately 1 year. This pattern of shorter duration when one takes into account
fundamentals also holds inthe History-Peak and Peak-End phases. Interestingly, the
average duration of the Peak-End phase is approximately one half of the duration
of the History-End period. Of course, behind this difference is the sudden return to
equilibrium produced by nominal devaluations.
We also present the frequency histograms of duration of our benchmark cases.
Figures 3 and 4 present the cases of entire episodes given an appreciation threshold
of 1570, with and without considering fundamentals. Figures 5 and 6, on the other
hand, present the histogram of the History-Peak and Peak-End phases duration with
the same threshold. Figures 19 to 22 in appendix A present the cases for an appreci-
ation threshold of 2570. The same conclusions hold. Duration is highly asymmetric
between the build-up and the come-back phases. The higher duration of the History-
Peak phase spreads over all categories of duration lwting more than 4 months. This
last conclusion is independent of the threshold and whether fundamentals are con-
14sidered. Also, including fundamentals reduces the duration of the episodes (not only
the average duration).
A final question regarding duration is what happens with incomplete cases, that is,
cases that remained being an episode when the data of the respective country ended. If
these cmes had significantly longer durations than the complete episodes, there would
be evidence that they are of a different nature, namely equilibrium appreciations (not
picked-up by trends and fundamentals) that only in the long run would disappear.
Table 3 shows the average duration (and number of episodes) of such cases. The main
conclusion is that these durations are almost always smaller than the durations of
complete ewes.
Table 3: Average Duration of Incomplete Appreciations
Episodes (number) History-Peak Peak-Incomplete
Trends - 15% 15.1 (16) 16.6 7.8
Trends - 25% 11.4 (5) 20.4 6.8
Fundam. - 15% 7.4 (8) 11,6 2.3
Fundam. - 25% 9.0 (3) 17.7 1.7
3.3 Temporal Distribution
Several structural changes in the world economy may have affected the temporal
distribution of appreciation episodes. Among other factors, changes in inflation levels,
capital mobility, and exchange arrangements may have produced bunching of cases
during some periods. ‘1 The presumption is that the first two have raised the likelihood
of appreciations during the second part of our sample, while the movement towards
more flexible exchange regimes may have decreased it.
Because our panel data is unbalanced —some countries have more observations
than others— the simple time path of number of cases is a misleading indicator of
the temporal distribution of cases. Instead, we present the ratio of episodes to total
21See appendix C for a description of exchange arrangements during our sample period.
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17countries in the sample with data grouped every 5 years. Cases are dated using the
date of Start ,22 The results for the benchmark cases with an appreciation threshold of
15% is presented in figures 7 and 8. The cases with a threshold of 25% are presented
in figures 23 and 24 in appendix A.
The graphs show that towards the second part of our sample the number of cases
clearly increases. In fact, during the period 1980–94 there are at least twice as much
cases as during 1960–75 (controlling for the number of potential episodes). The
cases with RER’s after controlling for fundamentals show an even more clear upward
trend. Interestingly, when only trends are considered, there is a notorious bunching
of episodes around 1980–85.
3.4 Exchange Arrangements
The overall trend of exchange arrangements is towards more flexible systems, al-
though some countries have changed their systems back to fixed regimes. Appendix
C describes our characterization of exchange arrangements and presents summary
statistics for our sample period.23
In order to evaluate whether appreciation episodes happen more often under spe-
cific exchange rate arrangements we compare the proportion of each type of arrange-
ment during the episodes (more specifically during the History-Peak and Peak-end
phases) with the proportion of each type observed in the total population.24 Because
of the trends issues discussed above, a total average would be misleading for the num-
ber of appreciations has increased over time and fixed exchange rate arrangements
have declined. In order to control for this problem we compare the proportion of each
type of arrangement of episodes grouped every 5 years with the population proportion
during those same 5 years. We then calculate a weighted average of this indicator
using the actual number of episodes that occurred during those same 5 years, The
date of the episodes is assigned according to the Start date. Table 4 presents these
22Notice that this ratio is not immune to composition effects. An example is given by developed
countries having more data, and being less likely to suffer appreciations.
23Using a panel of annual data, Ghosh et al, (1995) study the impact of exchange arrangements on
inflation and growth. They conclude that fixed regimes have less inflation and that the arrangement
is unrelated to growth.
241ncases in which episodes have more than one arrangement we calculate the episode’s proportion
of each arrangement according to the number of months each arrangement ww in place.
18Appreciation Threshold = 15%
5 Yew Period
Figure 7: Temporal Distribution - Trends Only
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19results.
Table 4: Exchange Arrangements of Appreciations
Proportion of Each Arrangement
Trends Trends Fundam. Fundam.
15% 25% 15% 25%
History-Peak Fixed 68.9 79.3 74.1 74.4
Phase Flexible 24.5 17.9 21.6 22.1
Floating 6.6 2.8 4.4 3.4
Dual-Mult. 32.3 40.1 37.0 54.8
Peak-End Fixed 63.1 71.9 68.6 65.7
Phase Flexible 29.2 24.4 25.0 26.9
Floating 7,7 3.6 6.3 7.4
Dual-Mult. 35.8 48.2 36.2 50.9
Total Fixed 62.0 60.8 61.5 59.7
Population Flexible 31.3 32.4 31.9 33.3
Floating 6.7 6.8 6.7 7.0
Dual-Mult 16.9 17.1 17.5 17.5
Average calculated every 5 years and weighted by the number of
episodes every 5 years.
Number represents percentage of time of each arrangement.
The results show that, as expected, fixed regimes are more likely to suffer ap-
preciations. This effect is higher when larger appreciations are considered. Flexible
regimes are less likely to suffer appreciations. These regimes include crawling pegs,
adjustable bands, adjustable pegs to baskets, and managed floating, In terms of dual
and multiple exchange rates, the results show that during appreciations episodes,
countries have these arrangements at least twice as many as in normal times. This
could be interpreted as implying that dual-multiple regimes have a higher probabil-
ity of appreciating. However, in this case the reverse causality also exists. When
an episode starts countries are more likely to put in place dual markets in order to
20improve the competitiveness of certain sectors.25
There are clear asymmetries in the exchange arrangements prevailing during the
History-Peak and Peak-End phases. In particular, the proportion of fixed exchange
rate arrangements is notably larger during the History-Peak period, The contrary
happens with flexible and floating arrangements. This fact gives support to the
notion that the return-to-equilibrium is more easily accomplished by flexible exchange
regimes, These results hold independently of appreciation thresholds and whether
fundamentals are included. Dual systems do not appear more likely during either
phase.
4 Nominal Exchange Rate-Inflation Decomposi-
tion
One of the basic questions in this paper is
that do not end in exchange rate collapses
whether there are appreciation episodes
or large devaluations, More specifically,
one can ask how do appreciation episodes end: Is the inflation differential —prompted
by the loss of competitiveness— enough to return to the equilibrium RER? How much
of the total work is done by the nominal exchange rate? In order to answer these
questions we constructed a monthly nominal exchange rate index for each country.
This index follows the movements of the pegs that a country may have, including
changes in the currency to which the peg is established. In cases in which unknown
baskets of currencies are the nominal target we use the nominal exchange rate with
respect the SDR. In cases of flexible and floating regimes we use the price of the
currency last used as a peg.
In order to decompose the real depreciation that occurs during the return to the
equilibrium we calculate the total depreciation of the actual RER during the Peak-End
phase, and the total nominal actual depreciation during that same period. Successful
appreciations can then be defined as episodes that require less than a certain threshold
26 Letting A denote percentage change we have in order to return to the equilibrium.
25This effect also means that, in these cases, the nominal exchange rate used to calculate the real
exchange rate loses its relevance.
26There is an important issue regarding appreciation cases that happen after a “structural” break
in the equilibrium RER. Our methodology does not allow for such changes, so we count this break
21the identity:
AE = ANom + A (P – P“)
where Nom is the nominal exchange rate index and P and P* the price indices. We
can then calculate
s=l-A:;m
as our successful index.
4.1 Detrended RER
4.1.1 Successful Index Distribution
A first issue to analyze is the distribution of our successful indicator S. Knowing
this distribution will allow us to measure how sensitive the definition of successful is
to the threshold for S. In particular, if very few cases are partially successful, the
threshold one chooses is not crucial.
Figures 9 and 10 present the histograms of the S indicator for our two benchmark
cases using the first methodology (trends as the equilibrium concept). We observe
a large mass of cases that are not successful at all —the nominal devaluation does
more than all the work.27 There is also some mass in totally successful cases —the
inflation differential does all the work. There are few cases in which the appreciation
was partially successful.
Finally, comparing figures 9 and 10, we observe that when larger appreciations
are considered, there is less probability of success (for any S), There is less mass on
or close to S = 1 in figure 10, where the threshold is 25Y0.
4.1.2 Searching For a Critical Cutoff
Knowing the distribution of S we can now search for the critical level of apprecia-
tion: the level at which a successful episode is very unlikely to happen. We define
(arbitrarily) a successful appreciation when the nominal exchange rate does less than
as an episode (that has an end). The key is that if this is the case, then the RER during the whole
episode is not under any pressure and nominal devaluations should not occur. This biases our results
towards observing successful cases.
ZTInflation differentials may have a negative contribution to the return. In this cases, nominal
devaluations do more than all the work.
22Appreciation Threshold = 15%
Work done by pricesduringPeak-End
Figure 9: Histogram of Success - Trends Only (15%)
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23Cases with Success Index >.50
““~
Figure 11: Probability of Successful Appreciation - Trends Only
half of the work (S > 0.5). Since the mass of partially successful cases is small our
conclusions do not critically depend on the successful definition. Figure 11 shows the
probability of success for different appreciation levels. Here each episode is considered
as one case, regardless of its duration. (In section 5 we explore in more detail the link
between degree of appreciation, time, and the probability of success).
When appreciations of 25% or more are considered only 10% of the cases are
successful —that is they devalue less than 5070 of the observed real depreciation
between Peak and End. This probability clearly decreases with the appreciation
level. The conclusion is that for large appreciations, say 25% or more, it is unlikely
to undo an appreciation without a devaluation; sooner or later a nominal exchange
rate correction is required.
4.1.3 Successful Episodes: Description
This subsection describes the appreciation episodes in which the nominal devaluation
caused less than half of the total real depreciation, so they can be considered as
relatively successful cmes. The initial sample includes appreciations of 25% or more,
24with respect to the trend RER.
Table 5: Successful Appreciation Episodes
Country Start-Date Duration Actual Actual Fixed Estimated
(months) Build-up Deprec. X-Arr Build-up
Paraguay oct.’77 5 22.6 32.3 1.0 25.1
Nepal oct.’72 2 22,1 36.5 1.0 27.0
Sri Lanka Aug.’7O 86 -9.7 196.0 0.7 37.3
Sri Lanka Feb.’94 9 14.0 5.4 0.0 25.1
Burundi Feb.’85 16 23.4 40.9 1.0 27.5
Ethiopia Aug.’84 22 35.0 55.1 1.0 37.7
Nigeria Jan.’6O 45 -4.1 1.0 34.1
Success if S >0.50- Appreciation Threshold = 25%
The list shows that these countries are not typical appreciation cases; if one con-
siders medium and large size countries the probability of success is even smaller.
Notably, almost all have fixed exchange arrangements. This does not mean that
fixed arrangements should be kept in place, for the probability of success of these
arrangements is small. The key policy recommendation is to avoid the appreciation
in the first place (or at least weight its benefits with the high probability of future
devaluation).
Finally, notice that a couple of successful episodes do not suffer an actual real
appreciation during the build-up period or an actual real depreciation during the
return-to-normality phase. mends in the RER make these cases to be identified as
appreciations under our definition.
4.2 RER and Fundamentals
If one repeats the exercise of the last section using the predicted RER calculated with
fundamentals none of the conclusions change. Moreover, the conclusion regarding how
difficult it is to undo appreciations without nominal devaluations is stronger: there are
no experiences of successful episodes if appreciations of 3570 or more are considered.
25Appreciation Threshold = 15%
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Figure 12: Histogram of Success -Fundamentals (15%)
Figures 12 to 13 show these results.
4.3 Conditional Probabilities
This subsection reports probabilities of successful appreciations conditional on dif-
ferent characteristics. Table 6 presents the results. First, during the second period
of the sample, 1980–1994, the probability of successful appreciations is substantially
lower than in the first period. Second, there is no apparent pattern relating success-
ful appreciations with the duration of the episodes. Third, as expected, flexible and
floating regimes are less prone to return to equilibrium through price changes.
5 Degree of Overvaluation and Transition Matri-
ces
One of the objectives of this study is to identify the probability of RER reversion in
a certain period of time, for various levels of appreciation. In particular, we would















Figure 13: Histogram of Success - Fundamentals (2570)
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Figure 14: Probability of Successful Appreciation - Fundamentals
27Table6: Probability of Success-Different Sampling
(Percentage)
Trends Only
Apprec. Total Float and Start after Long
Threshold Sample Flexible 1980 Duration
15 22.5 8.3 14.9 21.5
20 12.6 6.3 10.5 15.7
25 9.9 5.6 6.1 9.6
30 5.8 0.0 2.6 7.9
35 5.6 0.0 3.6 6.9
Fundamentals
Apprec. Total Float and Start after Long
Threshold Sample Flexible 1980 Duration
15 32.3 2.2 16,8 38.0
20 24.2 3.8 13.6 33.3
25 10.7 0.0 5.3 16.0
30 2.9 0.0 3.8 5.6
35 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Long duration = End – Start >6 months.
28like to test the assertion that the probability of returning to equilibrium is positively
correlated to the degree of appreciation.
Reconstructed transition matrices forour appreciation cases. The matrices show
the probability of reaching a specific exchange rate value conditional on a given degree
of appreciation. The overall sample is the exchange rate values of the appreciation
episodes, defined using the benchmark cutoff of 15%. Therefore, the matrices show
the conditional probability of reaching a specific exchange rate value once a country
has surpassed 15% appreciation in the past.
Table 5 presents the results for the case of trend RER. There are two points to
highlight from the table. First, there is a high degree of inertia in RER’s. All the
diagonal terms (shadowed for contrast) show substantially higher probabilities.zg In
part, this is a consequence of the relatively short transition time shown: 6 and 12
months, In fact, the transition table for 24 months (shown in appendix A) shows
lower inertia, although we still observe higher probabilities along the diagonal.
Second, once high degrees of appreciation are achieved (for instance, 30% in ta-
ble 5), there is a low probability of moving to a slightly lower appreciation degree
(in this case 0.05 to reach 20-25%), but a high probability of reversing the whole
appreciation (O,24 to reach a value lower than 570). This result shows that smooth
returns are highly improbable in large appreciation cases and get more unlikely as
the appreciation deepens.
Figure 15 plots the probability of returning to an appreciation of less than 5%
for several levels of appreciation. It plots the last column of the transition matrices
described above (for 6 and 12 months), but also other transition times as 1, 3, 24 and
48 months, As expected, the longer the period considered, the higher the probability
of return. With 48 months, for example, the probability of return ranges from 80 to
96Y0. This confirms the latest PPP mean-reversion results in the literature.
The more interesting and relevant result is the U-shaped curve obtained for the
probability figures. It shows that there is a threshold where increasing the level of
appreciation implies a higher probability of return. The reason for the nonlinearity
is the existence of a trade-off between distance and pressure factors. Since each curve
in figure 15 is plotted fixing the time period available to return, it is reasonable to
28There is a substantial larger mass in the diagonal term of appreciations of equal or higher than
3070. However, there is also more support in this area.
29Table 7: Transition Matrices of Appreciations -6 and 12 Months
Detrended RER
Appreciation Threshold = 15%
6 Months Matrix
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Figure 15: Degree of Appreciation and Probability of Return - Trends Only
31expect that small appreciations and, therefore, with shorter distances to cover, have
a higher probability of return. This is the distance factor and is reflected by the
downward slope part of the curves. On the other hand, as the degree of appreciation
deepens there are pressures that make the RER return to the equilibrium (as defined
above) which will tend to increase the probability of return. Figure 15 shows that
the pressures to return start to dominate when the appreciation reaches 20–25%.
The concern with appreciation episodes is not so much whether they will revert but
rather how this reversion will occur. In particular, the question is whether the rever-
sion will occur through a collapse in the nominal exchange rate as opposed to a smooth
reversion. Figure 16 plots the probability of a collapse, defined as a return with more
than 95% of the total real depreciation caused by nominal devaluation, as opposed
to inflation differentials (S <0.05 in terms of the success index). It is clear that the
probability of a collapse is an increasing function of the degree of appreciation.29 The
magnitudes are important also. Taking 24 months as a benchmark, the probability
of collapse increases from 0.36 to 0.57 when the degree of appreciation increases from
10% to 30%. Since we are focusing on the probability of collapse and not the broader
probability of return, figure 16 in fact isolates the pressure from the distance effect
(the shorter distance implies that the probability of return from a 5% appreciation
is high but not that the corresponding probability of collapse is higher). Therefore,
figure 16 in general does not show U-shaped curves.
We repeat
of equilibrium
in table 8 and
ones described
corresponding
the exercise using the episodes obtained from the second definition
RER (controlling for fundamentals). The transition matrices shown
the probabilities plotted in figures 17 and 18 are very similar to the
above, There are minor differences between figures 17 and 18 and the
15 and 16. First, the U-shaped curves are more pronounced when we
control for fundamentals. Also, since the overall duration of the episodes when we
control for fundamentals is shorter (see description in the previous section), the 24
month schedule does not have a U-shaped form (the probability of reversal is close
to 1 for any degree of appreciation). Figure 18 shows an even steeper slope for the
probability of collapse as a function of the degree of appreciation (see the 24 and 48
month schedules).
‘gHere each month of an episode corresponds to an observation. Before, in subsection 4.1.2, each
episode was an observation.
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33Table 8: Transition Matrices of Appreciations -6 and 12 Months
RER After Fundamentals
Appreciation Threshold = 15V0
6 Months Matrk
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36Subsampling We calculated the previous transition matrices and probability of
collapse using specific subsamples of our data. First, we divided our sample between
1960–79 and 1980–94. There are no significant differences between the two sub-
periods. Second, we divided our sample between fixed and flexible regimes (the
latter including a few cases of floating regimes). As expected, most of the results are
driven by fixed exchange regime episodes. Flexible regime overvaluation episodes do
not reproduce the steep upward sloping feature for the probability of collapse (as in
figure 16).
6 Conclusions
After the European and Mexican exchange rate crises during the fist half of the 90’s,
several studies have advanced the hypothesis that the level of the real exchange rate
30 This paper calculates is important in explaining future devaluations and collapses.
the probability of devaluation for various levels of real exchange rate looking at a
sample of 93 countries and tries to identify all the appreciation episodes during the
last 35 years (1960-1994).
The results show that it is relatively unlikely to smoothly undo appreciations
greater than 25%. In our sample, only 107o of the cases had a devaluation and
collapse-free return, This probability falls as we concentrate in even more appreciated
cases. There are no successful cases for appreciations larger than 3570.31
The paper also presents transition matrices for the appreciation episodes. They
show inertia in the real exchange rate for short periods of time: the RER tends to stay
overvalued and at relatively the same level for 3 to 6 months. More importantly, they
also show that, in a given period of time, it is much more probable to undo completely
the appreciation than to return the long-run equilibrium value only partially. This
suggests that appreciations end abruptly and do not have a smooth return, at least
in very appreciated cases. The transition matrices also focus on the probability of
collapse (excluding small and medium nominal devaluations). Taking a 24 month
horizon as a benchmark, the probability of collapse increases from 0,36 to 0.57 when
30See references in section 1.
31The benchmark here is cases chosen with an appreciation threshold of 25% controlling for
fundamentals.
37the degree of appreciation increases from 10% to 30%.
As a by-product the paper also characterizes the appreciation cases. We show
that appreciations have a longer duration in the build-up than in the return phase
and are more likely to occur in fixed exchange regimes and during the last part of our
sample period, in particular in the early 80’s,
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Figure 19: Histogram of Duration - Trends Only
40Appreciation Threshold = 25%














Figure 20: Histogram of Duration - Fundamentals
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Figure 23: Temporal Distribution - Trends OnlyTable 9: Transition Matrices of Appreciations -24 and 48 Months
Detrended RER
Appreciation Threshold = 15%
24 Months Matrix
RER Appreciation in t+24 months
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44B Exchange Arrangements Description
We classify exchange arangements along two dimension using the following coding:
Exchange Arrangements
1. Peg to American Dollar
2. Peg to British Pound
3. Peg to Prench Pranc
4. Peg to other currency (flagged)
5. Peg to SDR
6. Cooperative arrangements (e.g. EMS)
7. Peg to basket (incl. frequent adjustments)
8. Managed floating and other flexible arrangements
9. Pree floating
Dual-Multilateral Arrangements
O. Unique exchange rate for trade transactions
1. One or more rates for trade transactions
We consider arrangements 1 to 6 as fixed regimes, 7 and 8 as flexible, and 9
as floating. Table 10 presents the distribution of the proportion of each of these
aggregates, while table 11 presents the distribution of the 9 types of regime and the
proportion of dual and multiple exchange rate arrangements.
45Table 10: Exchange Arrangements -3 Aggregates
Proportion of Each Aggregate in Population
Regime 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94
Fixed 0.98 0.97 0.90 0.65 0.53 0.47 0.42
Flexible 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.29 0.40 0.45 0.46
Float 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.12
Table 11: Exchange Arrangements - Original Classification
Proportion of Each Type in Population






























































This appendix describes the initial sample of countries, data coverage for each country,
original frequency of series, and the price index used in the construction of the RER.
Country Price Original RER
Index Frequency Coverage
1 Austria AUT WPI Monthly 60-94
2 Belgium BEL CPI Monthly 60-94
3 Denmark DNK WPI Monthlv 60-94
4 I Finland I FIN I WPI I Monthly I 60-94
5 I France I FRA I CPI I Monthly I 60-94
6 I Germany I GER I WPI I Monthly I 60-94
7 I Greece I GRC I WPI I Monthly [ 60-94
8 Hungary HUN WPI Monthly 68-94.6
9 I Ireland I IRL I WPI I Monthly I 60-9-4.10
10 Italy ITA WP1 Monthly 6094
11 Netherlands NLD WPI Monthly 60-94
12 Norway NOR WPI Monthly 60-94
13 Poland POL WPI Monthly 80-94
14 Portugal PRT CPI Monthly 60-94
15 Romania ROM CPI Monthly 81-94
16 Spain SPA WPI Monthly 60-94
17 Sweden SWE CPI Monthly 60-94
18 Switzerland SWT WPI Monthly 60-93.5
19 Turkey TUR CPI Monthly 69-94
20 UK UKG WPI Monthly 60-94
21 Argentina ARG WPI Monthly 60-94
22 Bolivia BOL CPI Monthly 60-94
23 Brazil BRA WPI Monthly 60-94
24 Canada CAN WPI Monthly 60-94
25 Chile I CHL I WPI Monthly 6&94
continued on next page
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Country Price Original RER
Index Frequency Coverage
26 Colombia COL WPI Monthly 60-93
27 Costa Rica CRI WPI Monthly 60-94.1
28 Ecuador ECU WPI Monthly 75-94
29 El Salvador SLV WPI Monthly 60-94.10
30 Guatemala GTM CPI Monthly 60-94.10
31 Haiti HTI CPI Monthly 60-94
32 Honduras HND CPI Monthly 60-94
33 Jamaica JAM CPI Monthly 60-94
34 Mexico MEX WPI Monthly 60-94
35 Paraguay PRY WPI Monthly 60-94.4
36 Peru PER CPI Monthly 60-94
37 Trinidad & Tobago TTO CPI Monthly 60-94.10
38 us USA WPI Monthly 60-94
39 Uruguay URY CPI Monthly 60-94
40 Venezuela VEN WPI Monthly 60-94
41 Australia AUS WPI Monthly 60-94
42 Indonesia IDN CPI Monthly 71-94
43 New Zealand NZL CPI Quarterly 60-94
44 Papua New Guinea PNG CPI Quarterly 71-94
45 Bahrain BHR CPI Monthly 75.7-94
46 Bangladesh BGD CPI Monthly 74.7-94
47 China CHN Infl. Monthly 69.3-94.9
48 Hong Kong HKG CPI Monthly 69.3-94.9
49 India IND WPI Monthly 6W94
50 Iran IRN WPI Monthly 60-94
51 Israel ISR WPI Monthly 68-94
52 Japan JAP WPI Monthly 60-94.9
53 Jordan JOR CPI Monthly 76-94
54 Korea KOR WPI Monthly 60-94
55 Kuwait KWT WPI Monthly 73-9.6
continued on next page
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Country Price Original RER
Index Requency Coverage
56 Malaysia MYS CPI Monthly 60-94
57 Nepal NPL CPI Monthly 63.7-94.6
58 Pakistan PAK WPI Monthly 61.7-94
59 Philippines PHL WPI Monthly 60-94
60 Saudi Arabia SAU CPI Monthly 80.2-94
61 Singapore SGP CPI Monthly 60-94
62 Sri Lanka SLK CPI Monthly 60-94
63 Syrian Arab Rep. SYR WPI Monthly 60-94.9
64 Thailand THA WPI Monthly 60-94
65 Algeria ALG CPI Monthly 74-94
66 Burkina Faso BFA CPI Monthly 60-93
67 Burundi BDI CPI Monthly 74-94
68 Cameroon CMR CPI Monthly 68-90.9
69 Central Africa.Rep. CAF WPI Monthly 65-94.7
70 Congo COG CPI Monthly 64-94.7
71 Egypt EGY WPI Monthly 60-94.11
72 Ethiopia ETH CPI Monthly 66-94.10
73 Gabon GAB WPI Monthly 63-94.6
74 Ghana GHA WPI Monthly 63-94.9
75 Ivory Coast IVC CPI Monthly 60-94.9
76 Kenya KEN CPI Monthly 68-94.2
77 Liberia LBR CPI Monthly 68-90.6
78 Madagascar MDG CPI Monthly 64-94
79 Malawi MWI CPI Monthly 80-94.7
80 Morocco MAR CPI Monthly 60-94
81 Niger NER CPI Monthly 68-94
82 Nigeria NGA CPI Monthly 60-94.9
83 Rwanda RWA CPI Monthly 65.4-93
84 Senegal SEN CPI Monthly 68-94.9
85 Sierra Leona SLE CPI Monthly 86.10-94.9
continued on next page
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Country Price Original RER
Index Frequency Coverage
/86 I Somalia ISOMI CPI I Monthlv 163.10-89.111
1871 South Africal SAF I WPI I Monthly I 60-94 I
I 88 I Sudan ISDNI CPI I Monthly I 60-94.6 I
I 89 I Togo lTOGl WPI I Monthly I 70-93 I
I 90 I Tunisia I TUN I CPI I Monthly I 87.7-94 I
I 91 I Zaire I ZAR I Infl, I Monthly I 63-94 I
I 92 I Zambia I ZMB I CPI ] Monthly I 67.4-94 I
I 93 I Zimbabwe I ZWE I CPI I Monthly I 78-94 I
50D Trade Weights
Trade Partners
USA JAP GE~ FRA ITA sPA UKG NLD ARG BRA SAF SAW sGP AUS Others
BEL ,06 ,33 .26 .12 .23
DNK .10 .37 .10 ,16 .05 .22
FIN .13 ,06 .29 .07 ,18 .27
FRA .13 ,34 .21 .15 .17
GER .12 ,06 .22 .16 .13 .16 .13
GRC .05 .05 .35 .14 ,26 .10 .05
HUN .51 .09 .41
IRL ,16 .04 .14 .08 .54 .04
lTA I 1? I I an I ?0 I I 05 ,11 ,05 ,01 ... ... .W u.- . 1 I .
NLD .08 .-. . ,,.
NOR .12 .21 .08 I .29
POL .63 .11 .18
P RT .06 .30 ‘- “- ‘-
I 1 1 1 I
ROM .13 .49 1 . . r 1 1 1 1 1
SPA .12 ,26 .30 .1.9 .14
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I
JAM .57 ,15 .07 .21
M EX .84 ,06 .06 .04
PRY .15 .13 .13 .16 .42
PER .52 .15 .14 .09 .10
TTO .87 .08 .05
USA .35 .09 ,09 .47
WRY ,16 .13 .19 .50
VEN ,82 .13 .05
AUS .37 .44 .10 .08
lDN .22 .58 .09 .11
NZL .25 ,26 .05 .12 ,32
PNG .09 .34 ,09 .40 .09
BHR .10 .07 .08 ,74
BGD .44 .15 ,07 .09 .09 .16
CHN ,16 .23 .04 .57
HKG .26 .10 .05 .50
lND .31 .20 .19 .16 .07 .08
IRN .21 ,45 .19 .15
ISR ,44 .17 .06 ,15 .18
JAP .66 .14 .20
JOR .31 .10 .09 .10 .17 .22
KOR ,54 .46
KWT ,21 .21 ,13 .09 ,10 ,26
continued on next page
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Trade Partners
USA JAP GER FRA lTA SPA UKG NLD ARG BRA SAF SAW SGP AUS Others
MYS .31 I .36 I i .33
NPL ‘n11%19fi1nA I I I n. I I I I ,, I I “S
..” . . . .-v .v - .“. . . . .V”
.35 .27 .20 .10 .08
l-n. .54 .36 .09
SAW .42 .33 .07 .06 ,12
SGP .36 ,28 .05 .32
SLK .53 ,28 .10 .09
SYR .14 .11 .32 .35 .OB
THA .34 ,50 .15
ALG .22 .08 .29 .24 .05 .07 .05
B FA .06 .20 .41 .02 .03 .2a
BDI ,26 .17 .27 .29
CMR ,12 ,04 .11 ,47 .04 .07 .15
.-, ..-. -“ 1 1 --- 1 1 1 I I I I I
CAF ,05 .03 .51 .40
COG .16 .7 IS n~ n. I
EGY .67 .07 .06 .05 .09 .06
ETH .13 .26 .32 .20 .09
GAB .26 .05 .04 .60 .05
GHA .20 .14 An n, 1“
I .--, -,, I I 1 I I I I ..”
I 7? lG lVC I .07 I I ,13 I .42 I
[
KEN ,07 .15 ,22 .08 I .39 I 1--
I 1 1
,.-




LBR .32 .04 ,34 I .07 ,13 I ,10




,09 .14 ,12 .28 .36
N,A m .06 ,11 ,53 .13 .17
NER .07 .04 .05 .60 .04 ,20
NGA ,42 ,06 .16 ,06 ,0s ,11 ,10
RWA .10 .14 .12 ,64
SEN .05 .65 .13 .17
SLE .29 .08 .27 .19 .17
SOM .04 .26 .05 .65
SAF .30 .24 .22 ,24
SDN .09 .07 .09 .07 ,13 .32 .23
TOG .06 .06 .’33 .06 .07 .10 .22
TUN .04 ,21 .41 .2a .05
ZAR ,30 .07 ,12 .06 .13 .32
ZMB .08 .32 ,10 .11 ,14 .15 .05 .05
ZWE .16 ,05 .10 .20 .40
52